




World Order under Law
Reports to the House of Delegates*
I. International Atomic Energy Agency**
RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that the United
States government continue and enhance its support of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and take the following steps, with the cooperation and agreement
of other nations whenever appropriate.
A. Take positive steps to enhance the safeguards system, which is intended
to provide assurances of compliance by non-nuclear-weapon states to their
commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") and provide early
warning in the event of any violations. To this end, and in support of steps
the Agency has initiated since the 1991 Gulf War which revealed major
shortcomings, the United States Government should:
1. provide to the Agency, as appropriate, and encourage other states to do
so also, information from national technical means and other sources
relating to suspicious activities or potential violations of the NPT, any
safeguard agreements, or any UN Security Council resolution relating
thereto;
2. support inspections by the Agency at premises not declared by non-nuclear-
weapon states parties to the NPT in order to determine whether they
contain any type of nuclear activities and, if they do, to perform regular
inspections of any nuclear materials and facilities so located;
*These Recommendations and Reports were approved by the House of Delegates in August 1995.
**H. Francis Shattuck, Jr., Chair, Paul C. Szasz, Rapporteur, George Bunn, John B. Rhinelander,
and John H. Shenefield were principally responsible for this report.
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3. insist that the Agency, as a condition to any agreement to carry out safe-
guards in states not parties to the NPT as in all non-nuclear-weapon states
parties to the NPT, subjects all nuclear materials and facilities to full-scope
safeguards, including inspections;
4. insist that the Agency rescind permission to transfer controlled items,
such as nuclear-powered submarines, to non-weapon military activities
to which no safeguards apply.
B. Review and revise its historic position and insist that the Agency's safety
standards, or authorized equivalents, be applied to all nuclear facilities that
have received international assistance, whether commercial or non-
commercial, including all those to which the Agency applies safeguards pursu-
ant to the NPT or otherwise.
C. Consider whether there is a need to separate promotional and control activities
relating to nuclear energy, including the relative merits of the following
options:
1. Retaining the current structure of the Agency, and thereby continuing to
undertake both promotional and control activities through a single entity;
or
2. Replacing the Agency with the following:
a. a worldwide International Energy Agency with a mandate relating to
all types of energy, to which the IAEA's power-related activities would
be transferred;
b. an International Arms Control Agency with a mandate relating to con-
trols under all multilateral arms limitation and disarmament conven-
tions, which would take over the IAEA's safeguards, carried out pursu-
ant to the NPT or otherwise, and other monitoring responsibilities;
and
c. an International Nuclear Safety Agency, which might either be an
independent organization, or be a joint subsidiary organ of the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organisation
(ILO), or possibly be attached to the proposed International Energy
Agency;
while transferring the IAEA's isotope-related activities to suitable existing
agencies of the United Nations system.
REPORT
This report and recommendation is one of several relating to selected special-
ized agencies of the United Nations ("UN") and the International Atomic Energy
Agency ("IAEA" or the "Agency"). They have been developed by the Section
on International Law and Practice, International Institutions Committee, through
the Working Group on U.N. Specialized Agencies and the IAEA as a further
contribution of the A.B.A. to the 50th Anniversary of the UN, in fulfillment of
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the A.B.A.'s Goal No. 8-to advance the rule of law in the world. This report
relates to the IAEA. The recommendation relates to strengthening the safeguards
administered by the Agency against diversion of fissile materials into nuclear
weapons, to increasing adherence to safety standards developed by the Agency,
and to a possible division of the Agency's functions.
It is the singular misfortune of the Agency that it was founded in the late 1950s
on two major misconceptions relating to the course of development of nuclear
energy: that this would rapidly become a major if not essential source of electrical
energy in many countries; and that there would be only a limited number of
suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment. Consequently, if these suppliers
were all to cooperate with the Agency (which they could control through an
appropriately structured Board of Governors), then the IAEA would become the
central factor in a vital economic activity and would be in a position to regulate
that activity in the recipient countries (to prevent diversion to bomb production
and to ensure safety) by controlling the supply of materials and items essential
to their continued power production. The unrealizability of such a program was
a natal flaw that has required the Agency to modify both its goals and the means
to achieve them.'
The Beginnings of the Agency
The impulse for the creation of the IAEA was given by President Eisenhower's
"Atoms for Peace" address to the UN General Assembly in December 1953,
when in the wake of Stalin's death it was thought propitious to essay a modest
easing in US-USSR tensions and at the same time benefit the world community
by having each of the two main nuclear-weapon states transfer to the proposed
Agency some of the fissile materials in their stockpiles (thus reducing these).
The new organization could make these materials available, subject to appropriate
controls, to other states wishing to establish nuclear-generated electrical power
programs. After some three years of difficult negotiations, the IAEA was estab-
lished with a somewhat broader agenda: "to accelerate and enlarge the contribu-
tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world." 2
In many ways the new Agency was modeled on the U.S. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, and like it its principal task was to be the furtherance of nuclear power
subject to controls against military diversion and to ensure safety, with other
activities, such as isotope-related research, of secondary importance.
When the Agency started its operations in 1958 with some eighty members
it was faced with the difficulty that readily available nuclear-generated electrical
power was then still almost as far down the pike as when Eisenhower had spoken,
1. See generally Lawrence Scheinman, The IAEA and World Nuclear Order at 56-80 (Resources
for the Future, 1987).
2. IAEA Statute (276 UNTS 3; 8 UST 1093; TIAS 3873), Article II.
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and certainly was not an immediate prospect for most of its members. Indeed,
most of these were not at a developmental stage that would have allowed them
to utilize such a technology, except as an entirely foreign implant. Consequently,
the Agency had to develop activities that would maintain the interest of the bulk
of its membership and also prepare it for the eventual arrival of nuclear power.
Thus, from the very beginning, the Agency's programs were skewed towards
technical assistance and isotope-related activities, primarily in agriculture, medi-
cine and industry.
As to the organization's principal objective, assistance in the development of
nuclear power, its activities never became more than peripheral. Largely this
was due to the attainment of electrical power generation turning out to be much
more complicated and expensive than originally foreseen, so that significant
projects to that end were always beyond the technical and above all the material
capacity of the Agency-whose annual budget was never more than a minor
fraction of the cost of a medium-size power reactor.
Consequent on the lag in the establishment of nuclear reactors for power genera-
tion, the Agency's safeguards also received an uneven start. Instead of constituting
a control on Agency-assisted projects, which were few in number and insignificant
from a potential military point of view, once the Agency's safeguards rules were
established their first extensive application was to US-assisted overseas projects
(the safeguards under which the USA assigned to the Agency). Another unex-
pected factor was that during the initial years the USSR, which had initially
opposed the plans for establishing the Agency on the ground that it would lead
to uncontrollable proliferation, actively opposed strong safeguards-on this point
supporting India and other implacable opponents. Some years later the USSR
once more switched positions and from then on (including Russia as the USSR's
successor) became a partner of the USA on most safeguards proposals.
THE AGENCY'S CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND MANAGEMENT SAFEGUARDS
Objectively, and certainly from the point of view of most developed countries,
the most important activity of the Agency is its safeguards-that is the control
measures to prevent a non-nuclear-weapon state from diverting to nuclear weap-
ons any nuclear materials ostensibly devoted to peaceful purposes-which the
Agency carries out pursuant to Articles III.A.5 and XII of its Statute. The safe-
guard control measures are not, as was originally conceived, an ancillary function
of the Agency's nuclear-power programme, but rather since 1970 constitute the
implementation of one of the world's primary arms control measures, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty ("NPT" or the "Treaty"), 3 under Article 111.3 of which
3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (729 UNTS 161; 21 UST 483; TIAS
6839; 7 ILM 811). Safeguards are also carried out under the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty (634
UNTS 281; 22 UST 762; TIAS 7137; 6 ILM 521), and the South Pacific Rarotonga Treaty (24 ILM
1440), usually in association with NPT-based controls.
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all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty must conclude safeguards
agreements with the IAEA. Consequently, in most of the countries in which
safeguards are carried out, this is done not to control materials or equipment
that the Agency has made available, nor even such as have necessarily been
imported from some other state, but rather to control all declared peaceful nuclear
activities-whether these are based wholly or in part on foreign assistance or are
of purely domestic origin. Indeed, from the point of view of the efficacy of
these controls, there is no doubt about the superiority of so-called full-scope
safeguards (i.e., those that apply controls to all peaceful nuclear materials and
facilities in a country rather than only to those that have been received from or
been produced with direct or indirect assistance from a foreign state). While
full-scope safeguards are applicable to all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to
the NPT, they do not apply to non-parties, which at present include India, Israel
and Pakistan. Further, the safeguards do not apply under the terms of the NPT
to any of the facilities in the five nuclear-weapon states, although the USA and
others have voluntarily put some of their peaceful programs under IAEA safe-
guards.
Over the years opponents of safeguards did succeed in whittling them down,
from the very strict ones authorized (but not commanded) by the IAEA's Statute;
to those set out in a series of "Safeguards Documents"; to those authorized in
the respective safeguards agreements with states; to those provided for in the
subsidiary implementation arrangements; to those that were actually carried out
under prevailing circumstances. This constitutes a hierarchical scheme, in which
no lower measure can ever be stricter than what is authorized by the higher, and
in which any concession reluctantly made to one state generally has to be applied
to all.
Nevertheless, for many years the Agency considered that its safeguards con-
trols, while necessarily not perfect, were at least adequate to enable it to raise
a hue and cry if a significant (i.e., from the point of view of making a minimum
size bomb) quantity of nuclear materials could not be accounted for-or rather
when it was deliberately prevented from carrying out controls required for such
an accounting. It was clear, of course, that carrying out full-scope safeguards
was dependent on the honesty of at least the initial reports made by the controlled
country as to the peaceful nuclear activities that were being carried out within
it, as the Agency had neither the legal (under the applicable safeguards agreement)
nor the material capacity to roam around freely so as to detect any concealed
nuclear activities or installations. However, the Agency acted as though what it
might not be able to detect directly might nevertheless be hinted to it by states
with effective intelligence services or with national technical means (e.g., low
earth-orbit satellites) that could note if something suspicious went on within the
borders of a controlled country-whereupon the Agency could, after some legal/
political maneuvering, have its Board of Governors authorize a special inspection
to observe more closely undeclared but suspicious facilities or activities. Until
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1990, it certified annually that no state under safeguards had likely succeeded in
diverting, whether covertly or overtly, a significant quantity of nuclear materials.
This complacency was shattered by the discoveries made in Iraq in the wake of
its defeat in the Gulf War. Even though that country had since 1972 been under
full-scope safeguards under a safeguards agreement4 required because of its partici-
pation in the NPT and even though special attention had been focused on that coun-
try in the wake of the 1981 Israeli destruction of its one declared reactor, it was
discovered after the war by inspectors on the ground that Iraq had advanced quite
far on several parallel tracks towards building nuclear weapons. These discoveries
were made not as a result of normal IAEA safeguards, but in the course of unique
special inspections, carried out in part by the Agency and in part by a special UN
Commission, both acting under the authority of the UN Security Council. The fact
that previously the Agency had had no hard evidence or even suggestion of the
extent of these activities constituted not so much a failure of the Agency's overt
safeguards system, because it was always recognized that even full-scope safe-
guards could not normally detect deliberately unreported activities, as it did failure
of the implicit backup through the above-mentioned national intelligence services,
which in this instance had failed completely. Neither the CIA, nor Mossad, nor
other reputedly effective services seemed to have understood what was really going
on in that extremely closed society. The Iraqi debacle has led to a re-examination
of important premises of the safeguards system, and in particular to a strengthening
of the rules relating to special inspections-the first real tightening of any aspect
of the safeguards system since its establishment.
Soon, however, the difficulties of implementing an NPT-based safeguards
agreement' against determined opposition were demonstrated in a different con-
text by North Korea. Here suspicion was aroused by a discrepancy as to amounts
of plutonium separation noted by Agency inspectors, as well as by information
obtained from a secondary source (i.e., US satellite images showing probable
waste sites), but were hardened by the refusal of the target country to allow
certain special inspections, which could only be explained rationally by a desire
to conceal a diversion. The Agency was thus in a position to inform the Security
Council of this likelihood-that is, to strike the international alarm-which is all
the Agency could ever expect to do to prevent diversion.
Because at a recent conference the parties to the NPT extended its term indefi-
nitely, the Agency's safeguards responsibilities under that Treaty have similarly
been prolonged. The NPT parties at the same time also declared that "Decisions
adopted by the [IAEA's] Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the
effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the
Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased."
4. 872 UNTS 219.
5. IAEA/INFCIRC/403; 33 ILM 319; UNTS Reg. No. 28986; safeguards had previously been
applied under a non-NPT agreement set out in 1065 UNTS 525.
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Finally, it should be noted that the Agency's post-Gulf War actions in Iraq
were justified by the charge under its Statute and its Relationship Agreement
with the United Nations 6 to assist the Security Council at the latter's demand.
Similar justifications would have to be found if the Agency were to be charged, as
has been proposed, with implementing the verification system of a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty.
PROTECTION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
On its face, the Agency's right and obligation to impose controls relating to
the protection of health and safety are, under its Statute, almost precisely the
same as those relating to safeguards. The drafters of that instrument evidently
considered that failures to maintain a safe nuclear environment would constitute
a danger to the world community comparable to nuclear weapons proliferation.
Notwithstanding, the Agency almost from the beginning took a completely
different approach in respect of these two control activities. Yielding to the
strongly held position of practically all members states, that safety is basically
a domestic concern, the IAEA never attempted to impose any real safety controls
over nuclear activities-not even with respect to the few that were directly assisted
by the Agency. Only in the wake of the almost disaster of Three Mile Island
and the massive one of Chernobyl was it recognized that such events could not
only have significant material transboundary effects, but also injure the prospects
of peaceful nuclear activities throughout the world. Yet, even Chernobyl was
not able to reverse the rejection of international controls in this area, as appears
clearly from the 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention7 developed by the Agency
after extensive studies and negotiations, which reaffirms "that responsibility for
nuclear safety rests with the State having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation"
and "entails a commitment [by states parties] to the application of fundamental
safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety standards."
Aside from the failure to impose its safety standards, which was also due to
the absence of any external treaty regime (such as the NPT) that would have
required states to accept such standards and Agency controls, it also seems likely
6. Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute requires the Agency to submit reports on its activities
"when appropriate, to the Security Council" and "if in connexion with the activities of the Agency
there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall
notify the Security Council . . and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including
those provided in paragraph C of article XII [i.e., to carry out inspections provided for in safeguards
agreements and to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance by a safeguarded state]." Article IX
of the UN/IAEA Relationship Agreement (281 UNTS 369) provides that "The Agency shall co-operate
with the Security Council by furnishing it at its request such information and assistance as may be
required in the exercise of its responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace
and security."
7. IAEA/INFCIRC/449; 33 ILM 1518.
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that the Agency's functions as a promotor of nuclear power tended to interfere
with impulses to take safety really seriously when advising states about the design
of existing or future facilities. Safety (unlike safeguards) can be very expensive,
and may affect the competitiveness of nuclear power in particular situations. Also,
some three decades of practically accident-free operations worldwide tended to
justify complacency.
This having been said, one must hasten to add that the Agency has accomplished
something of great utility in this field: the continuous development of a series
of safety standards for all types of nuclear activities. Utilizing its own staff, as
well as national experts and those of other international agencies, in particular
the WHO and ILO in the UN System and regional ones such as the ENEA of
OECD and Euratom, it has promulgated a series of standards that can be utilized
directly, or incorporated into national or international legislative or regulatory
instruments. While perhaps not essential for the few most highly developed states
able to create such standards for themselves-though even these may benefit
when international uniformity is required, such as in transport regulations-most
countries could not through their own efforts create health and safety instruments
of such high quality.
NUCLEAR-RELATED INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
Over the years, the Agency has sponsored a number of international treaties re-
lated to the civil uses of nuclear energy. The first of these was the Vienna Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 8 which took decades to enter into force
for a minimal number of states and for various fundamental reasons is unlikely to
accomplish the mission impossible for which it was designed; this is largely also
true of the [Brussels] Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships. 9
More useful is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.' 0
The two post-Chernobyl treaties, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident" and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency, 2 govern matters for which the formal treaty structure
appears somewhat too heavy and clumsy but which nevertheless are helpful. Fi-
nally, the new Convention on Nuclear Safety, '3 though considerably compromised
during the years of its negotiation, still does impose some minimal safety-related
obligations on the parties and thus tends to internationalize a matter that most states
with nuclear activities still insist is primarily domestic. Work has started on a con-
vention on the safety of radioactive waste management.
8. IAEA Legal Series No. 2 at 501-12; IAEA Legal Series No. 4 at 3-15; 1063 UNTS 265.
9. IAEA Legal Series No. 4 at 36-46.
10. TIAS 11080; IAEA/INFCIRC/274/Rev.1; UNTS Reg. No. 24631.
11. IAEA/INFCIRC/335; 25 ILM 1377; UNTS Reg. No. 24404.
12. IAEA/INFCIRC/336; 25 ILM 1369; UNTS Reg. No. 24643.
13. IAEA/INFCIRC/449; 33 ILM 1518.
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OTHER ACTIVITIES
The other activities of the Agency can roughly be lumped under headings
such as research and development and technical assistance, with many in effect
fitting into both these categories. Many are no doubt useful, though few are
really essential to the role of the IAEA as conceived by the USA. Isotopes
or other radiation sources have become useful tools in aspects of agriculture,
medicine, industry and other research. But, as these techniques become well
established, they take on the nature of tools that are better wielded by those
expert in the trade in which they are used rather than by the toolmaker himself.
For the nonce, the Agency cannot afford to surrender these and similar activi-
ties entirely, for it would risk becoming irrelevant to the bulk of its member-
ship, whose sole contact with the organization would then be through the mild
burden of safeguards.
GOVERNANCE
Like all similar international organizations (e.g., the specialized agencies),
the IAEA is governed by an all-member General Conference, a restricted Board
of Governors and a Director General who heads the Secretariat. Over the years,
the power relations between these organs have somewhat shifted. The Board of
Governors is clearly the central organ of the Agency. Though nominally the
General Conference is hierarchically superior, in effect it can take few actions
without a recommendation of the Board. The latter meets more frequently and
its members are always present in Vienna though the number of its formal sessions
has been far reduced.
One distinct change that has occurred is in the composition of the Board.
Originally it had 23 members, only 10 elected by the Conference while the
majority were co-opted by the Board from a rather restricted group of nuclear
suppliers. Now the Board has 35 members, of whom 22 are elected by the Confer-
ence-to which it has therefore become far more responsive. Thus the originally
designed dominance of the suppliers has waned.
FINANCING
Article XIV of the IAEA Statute foresees that the Agency will have an adminis-
trative budget (including unreimbursed safeguards expenses) to be met from
assessed contributions, that it would earn money from operations in accordance
with a scale of charges established by the Board, that it may receive voluntary
contributions and that it might borrow money (solely on its own credit), presum-
ably for capital expenditures. The budget is drafted annually by the Director
General (though on the basis of biennial programs established in the framework
a rolling 6-year plan), and recommended by the Board to the General Conference
(which can only approve it or send it back to the Board).
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For 1995, the total budget approximated US$319 million, of which $203 million
(63.6 %) was raised by assessment on member states (on a scale adapted from that
of the UN), $11 million (3.4%) from miscellaneous services and sales, $9 million
(2.8%) from other UN System organizations for joint programs, $63 million
(19.7%) from voluntary contributions for technical assistance, and $36 million
(11.3 %) from contributions to special projects. Of the expenditures, $90 million
(28.2 %) was spent for isotope-related activities (mostly in the form of technical
assistance), $77 million (24.1%) for safeguards, $23 million (7.2 %) for nuclear-
power-cycle-related activities, $32 million (10.0%) for health and safety, $6 mil-
lion (1.9 %) for reimbursed work, and $91 million (28.5 %) for management and
other overhead. There have never been any large capital projects requiring loans,
nor has the Agency engaged in the sale of or other transactions in nuclear materials.
COORDINATION
The Agency is part of the UN System of organizations, not technically as a
"specialized agency" as foreseen in UN Charter Articles 57 and 63, but still
bound to the UN by a Relationship Agreement substantively identical to those
of most similar institutions (e.g., ILO, FAO, WHO, UNESCO) and like these
organizations less independent than the Bretton Woods institutions. It also has
Relationship Agreements with many of these UN-related agencies, as well as
Cooperation Agreements with several regional organizations.
As pointed out above, the Agency's principal substantive activity is the imple-
mentation of NPT-required safeguards. In recent years it has in addition carried
out extensive controls in Iraq on the behest of the Security Council. Other activities
are undertaken on behalf of common efforts such as those for the protection of
the environment, in which connection Agency collaborators include UNEP, IMO,
and the Basel Convention Secretariat.
The Future of the Agency
There are two important structural problems relating to the Agency: one inher-
ent in itself, and one in the system within which it functions. The former is
that the Agency combines the functions of promoting and of controlling nuclear
energy-an incompatibility that years ago led to the splitting up of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission eventually into the DOE and the NRC-and that is
specifically condemned for national organizations by the Agency-sponsored new
Nuclear Safety Convention. No matter how honestly they might try, nuclear
promoters are too often incapable of the tough love required to insist on the great
cost of additional safety measures or to give a true assessment of a mishap.
The external problem is that the world lacks a real energy agency, one capable
of assessing on a continuing basis the competing alternatives and choosing the
one most suitable for a particular task; one whose mandate is not to promote a
particular form of energy but to promote regard for basic values, such as all
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aspects of the environment, the proper balancing of current and future inputs
and outputs, energy conservation, and social and economic costs.
The logical response therefore is to establish an International Energy Agency
(not the limited European one created in the wake of the 1974 oil shock) into
which the IAEA's nuclear power functions would be folded, and an International
Arms Control Agency which would take over safeguards pursuant to the NPT
as well as the controls for the Chemical Weapons Convention' 4 and for a Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty and any limitations agreed on the trade in or the produc-
tion of conventional arms. Nuclear safety might require a specialized institution,
an International Nuclear Safety Agency, which might either be an independent
organization, or be a joint subsidiary organ of the WHO and ILO, or possibly
be attached to the proposed International Energy Agency. Activities such as the
many isotope-related ones would be transferred to the organization responsible
for the substantive field in which radiation techniques have proven or may prove
to be useful, e.g., to FAO, WHO, UNIDO.
If this separation of functions is too ambitious a goal in the short run, the
following more limited reforms should in any event be implemented:
(c) Safeguards should, on the basis of the Agency's experience in Iraq and North
Korea, as well as developments in countries such as in India, Pakistan, Israel
and South Africa, be made full-scope for all non-nuclear-weapons states.
Also, as has happened since the Gulf War, the Agency should be unshackled
from restrictions to officially declared facilities and materials, so as to allow
(obviously subject to negotiated restrictions) for inspections any place and
time-as originally foreseen in Article XII.A.6 of the IAEA Statute and as
largely accepted under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This would mean:
(i) that the Agency would no longer agree to carry out safeguards in non-NPT
parties that are restricted merely to certain nuclear materials and facilities,
but would insist that, as in all non-nuclear-weapon NPT states, all nuclear
materials and facilities be subject to controls; (ii) the permission to transfer
controlled items to non-weapon military activities (e.g., a nuclear submarine
reactor) to which no controls apply should be rescinded; (iii) the Agency
should be given considerable freedom to perform at least cursory inspections
of unreported premises, merely to determine whether they contain any type
of nuclear activities-and if they do, regular inspections should be carried
out. ' 5
(d) Safety controls should be greatly enhanced, to include the requirement of
substantive adherence to the Agency's safety standards (as developed from
time to time) and compulsory monitoring of compliance by major facilities
(in particular, reactors), at least in respect of all nuclear activities that have
14. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (UN document CD/CW/WP.400/Rev. 1; 32 ILM 800).
15. At present, the IAEA is moving toward accomplishment of (iii), but not (i) and (ii).
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